The double deductible problem in Florida

In a statistical sense, the probability that the same property is damaged by multiple hurricanes is surely a rare event.  However, this is a situation which many property owners in Florida now face.  The print media is filled these days with examples of policyholders whose properties have sustained separate damages from Hurricanes Charlie and Frances who will likely have to pay two deductibles.  Hopefully this won’t become an n deductible problem; obviously whether n will be greater than or equal to two will depend upon how the rest of the hurricane season plays out.

While one cannot help but be sympathetic toward people who face such financial hardships, it is also important to think through this issue in a logical fashion. Under most property insurance contracts, claims and deductible payments are related to a specific insured event.  The insurance policy promises to make the property owner whole after an insured event occurs (where being made whole is defined as paying the difference between the property damage related to the insured event and the deductible).  Even if a policyholder suffers the misfortune of multiple (e.g., 2, 3, …, n) different hurricanes affecting the same property, contractually these represent multiple insured events, not one.  Consequently, n deductibles apply.  Similarly, a person who has the misfortune of being involved in multiple car accidents is not afforded the option of treating multiple accidents as one event; in fact, these are multiple events and each event has its own claim settlement process.

A useful way to think about the double deductible problem is to relate it conceptually to the World Trade Center controversy.  In that case, there was one insured event; specifically, a coordinated strike by terrorists on the two buildings.  Although it could be (and certainly was) argued that were two insured events, the court’s decision to treat it as one event appropriately came down to a question of policy language, which is why the “one event” position eventually prevailed in that case.  In the case of Florida homeowners insurance, multiple deductibles follow as a logical consequence of (state regulated) homeowners insurance policy forms which require separate claims and deductibles for damage on separately named storms.  From a contractual standpoint, Hurricanes Charles and Frances were clearly two different insured events, so two deductibles (or three if Ivan also ends up hitting the same property) would seem appropriate and consistent with standard policy form contract language and legal principles of insurance.

In all likelihood, the state of Florida will end up considering various regulatory reforms once this hurricane season is over.  Even Florida governor Jeb Bush has weighed in on this issue, suggesting that the double deductible is something that might need to be changed because of the financial hardship that this creates for many property owners.  In my view, a constructive approach would involve giving consumers the option to choose between a policy based upon the current policy form, and an alternative policy that would enable consumers to insure against aggregate losses.  Contractually, the latter policy type would closely resemble a typical health insurance contract which has a “stop loss” provision built in for aggregate losses.  Since the alternative policy would provide consumers with the opportunity of insuring against paying multiple deductibles, consumers could expect to pay more for the alternative policy than for the current policy.  Besides offering consumers greater choice, such a policy reform would improve market efficiency.  So long as these contracts are fairly priced, chances are that the worse-than-average risks would tend to gravitate toward the stop loss policy, whereas the better-than-average risks would tend to gravitate toward the current policy form.

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Catastrophes and Moral Hazard: The Case of Florida Windstorm Risk

An important public policy aspect of catastrophes such as hurricanes, floods, earthquakes and terrorist actions is the effect of public disaster relief on the incentives of private firms and individuals to make prudent risk management decisions.  Typically, economists are most worried by the possibility that public disaster relief, however well intentioned, may make matters worse in the long term by undermining incentives for firms and individuals to select economically efficient levels of private insurance and loss mitigation. 

A useful way to think about this problem is to consider what optimal risk management and insurance decisions might look like in a world without public disaster relief, and compare these decisions with the decisions that are likely to be made in a world with public disaster relief.  Since consumers fully internalize the costs and benefits of risk management and insurance decisions in the former case, but do not in the latter, the prospect of public disaster relief reduces consumers’ demand for private insurance and incentivizes consumers to underinvest in loss mitigation.  This is a classic example of the so-called “moral hazard” problem.  Moral hazard refers to the tendency for insured consumers to change their behavior in ways that increase the probability and/or size of claims.  It is an important issue whenever risk sharing occurs and the price at which risk is transferred is distorted in some fashion; e.g., in the form of subsidized insurance provided after the fact by public entities such as FEMA.

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Financial Implications of Hurricanes

Fortunately, the severity of damage from Hurricane Frances will likely be much less severe than what was anticipated in the later part of last week.  Then, forecasters were bandying about Andrew/911 level estimates; e.g., $20-$50 billion.  The three most prominent insurance risk management companies, AIR Worldwide, Risk Management Solutions and EQECAT, now estimate that insured losses from the storm will likely range from $2 billion to $10 billion, which still aren’t exactly “chump change”.  Combined with Charley’s insured losses of $7 billion, this is turning out to be a rather expensive hurricane season for the insurance industry.

The worst hurricane (in terms of total property damage and insured losses) was Hurricane Andrew, a Category 4 hurricane which hit Florida in August 1992.  Andrew caused $20.3 billion in losses for insurers (in today’s dollars) and caused a dozen insurance carriers to go bankrupt.  Andrew set in motion fundamental changes in the way that the insurance business is conducted in Florida.  Consider the following examples of private sector innovation:

  • Insurers (e.g., USAA) have begun to experiment with insurance securitization, where catastrophe risks are shared in capital markets rather than in the reinsurance markets. 
  • Companies doing business in Florida have begun to set up separately capitalized subsidiaries which theoretically could fail without taking their parents down (e.g., Allstate has such a subsidiary, called “Allstate Floridian”).  This strategy enables insurers to create financial firewalls between their Florida companies and the rest of their business organizations, thereby limiting the financial consequences of rate suppression and the risk of insolvency which would otherwise have to be borne by the parent company.

Furthermore, other mechanisms have been put in place which causes consumers and the state government to share more of the catastrophe risk.  Consider the following:

  • Florida Hurricane Cat Fund. After Andrew, Florida created a risk pool which provides catastrophe reinsurance for companies writing homeowners insurance policies in the state of Florida. Allstate will only pay out $425 million for Charley-related losses because the fund pays 90% of Allstate’s losses in excess of $305 million; thus Charley was a manageable loss for Allstate.  In comparison, Allstate’s net exposure to Andrew resulted in a $2.5 billion loss (in 1992 dollars) Similarly, State Farm is expected to pay out $200 million for Charley-related losses, compared with $3.7 billion for Andrew-related losses.  Similar stories apply for other major insurers with significant Florida exposure; e.g., companies such as Nationwide, St. Paul Travelers, CNA, The Hartford, etc.).
  • Insurer of Last Resort: Citizens Property Insurance Corporation. Because insurance price regulations have generally suppressed rates below their true costs, this has provided insurers with incentives to “cherry pick”; i.e., select the best risks, and refuse to cover higher risk properties.  Many of these higher risk properties have been picked up by the state-run Citizens Property Insurance Corp., created by the Florida Legislature in 2002 as an insurer of last resort. Interestingly, Citizens Property Insurance Corp. has become so “successful” that it currently insures 800,000 coastal homes that private insurers refuse to fully cover.  
  • Higher deductibles mean that consumers pay a higher proportion of claims. Some homeowners pay anywhere from 2-5% of windstorm losses, vs. the less than 1% typical for fire damage. Pre-Andrew, deductibles were typically specified in terms of absolute dollar amounts rather than percentages.

It will be interesting to see how this hurricane season plays out.  To date, the damages have been very manageable for the insurance industry.  However, if we have many more storms like Charley and Frances, this may have significant pricing and coverage implications for property insurance markets throughout the United States.  Historically, the capital shocks from major catastrophes such as Andrew and 911 caused insurance rates and reinsurance rates to rise and coverage levels to fall.  This is to be expected, since capital shocks result in capacity constraints in these markets, which in turn result in higher rates and lower coverage.

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Kerry up, markets down? A regression analysis

In the August 11, 2004 issue of the Wall Street Journal, an article by Eric Engen (resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute) entitled “Kerry Up, Markets Down” appeared which makes the following claim: “…Sen. Kerry has promised to repeal a significant portion of (the Bush) tax cuts if elected, including the tax rate reductions on dividend and capital gain income. With the growth rate of the economy high but slowing somewhat, there are signs that this promise is rattling financial markets. The evidence suggests that when Sen.Kerry’s political fortunes rise, the stock market tanks.” Steve Forbes, editor in chief of Forbes and former (Republican) presidential candidate, weighed in with a similar opinion piece (entitled “The Rubinian Candidate”) in today’s Wall Street Journal.

Mr. Engen’s analysis is based upon graphically comparing 5 day moving averages of the 2004 US Presidential “Winner Takes All” Kerry Futures Contract Prices with 5 day moving averages of the S&P 500 index. While it appears that the two time series move in opposite directions, a more convincing analysis requires determining whether what seems visually apparent is statistically significant. Experimental evidence shows that people tend to see order even when the charts they are looking at consist of randomly generated numbers. Therefore, I computed daily returns on the S&P 500 and the Kerry Futures contract and regressed stock returns on Kerry Futures contract returns for the period June 2, 2004 through August 9, 2004. I selected this period because the data source (the Iowa Electronic Markets database) has a continuous price history on the Kerry Futures contract which began on June 1, 2004.

The regression equation that I estimated is specified as follows:

rS&P500,t = a + brKerry,t + et,

where rS&P500,t = daily return on the S&P 500, rKerry,t = daily return on the Kerry Futures contract, a = intercept, b =slope; and et= error term. The following table summarizes the regression statistics:

Regression Statistics

R2

0.0680

Parameter

Coefficients

Standard Error

t Stat

P-value

a

-0.0010

0.0010

-0.9972

0.3240

b

-0.0389

0.0215

-1.8122

0.0766

This regression equation has (as one would expect) a relatively low coefficient of determination, or R2 of only .068. In other words, there are other (probably much more) important determinants of stock market returns other than the odds of a Kerry presidency. Furthermore, since 1) the sign of the regression coefficient associated with returns on the Kerry Futures contract is negative, and 2) the correlation coefficient between the dependent and independent variable in a univariate regression equation equals the square root of the coefficient of determination, this implies that the correlation coefficient between returns on the Kerry Futures contract and the S&P500 index is -.26.

Two important questions remain: 1) is the effect statistically significant and 2) is the effect economically significant? The answers to these questions are 1) yes, and 2) no.

Let’s look first at the question of statistical significance. Whether a particular independent variable is statistically significant depends upon the P-value associated with its regression coefficient. A regression coefficient’s P-value indicates the probability of “Type 1” error. Type 1 error occurs whenever one concludes that a relationship exists when in fact it does not. Furthermore, one must differentiate between “1 tail” and “2 tail” tests. The P-values listed here are for 2 tail tests, meaning that the “null” hypotheses we are trying to reject are a = 0 and b = 0. In the case of Engen’s theory, since the null hypothesis we are trying to reject is that b is non-negative, a 1 tail test is more appropriate. Consequently, based upon these test statistics, we would conclude that a is not statistically different from 0, and that the negative relationship between returns on the Kerry Futures contract and the S&P500 index is statistically significant (at the 7.66%/2 = 3.83% level). Technically, the 1 tail P-value of 3.83% suggests that the probability of committing Type 1 error (i.e., concluding that a negative relationship exists when in fact it does not) is very small.

Next, consider the economic significance of the effect. Even though it is statistically significant, the actual magnitude of the effect is quite small. Specifically, on average, a 1 percent change in the value of the Kerry Futures contract is associated with a -0.0389% change in the value of the S&P500 index. Based upon this result, I would have to conclude that Mr. Eng
en’s basis thesis (that when Sen. Kerry’s political fortunes rise, the stock market “tanks”) does not represent a particularly fair characterization of this relationship. There is an inverse relationship, but the economic significance of the effect is rather negligible.

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Political “futures” markets II

The idea of relying upon futures markets prices to forecast future events has an interesting history. Nearly 20 years ago, Richard Roll published a paper in the American Economic Review entitled “Orange Juice and Weather” which showed, among other things, that the futures market in orange juice concentrate is a better predictor of Florida weather than the National Weather Service. Since the only way one can earn excess profits in a speculative market is to gain an informational advantage over the competition, traders are strongly motivated to try to do just that. As I noted in my previous blog entry about political “futures” markets (see ‘Political “futures” markets I’), if markets are informationally efficient, it follows that market prices represent unbiased forecasts concerning future events. Technically, this means that on average, the market’s estimate of the average value of the event in question is likely to be quite accurate. Consequently, I believe that political “futures” markets are more reliable indicators of the odds of a Bush or Kerry win than surveys conducted by the various media companies. With this in mind, it is interesting to observe what the political futures markets are telling us. As Alex Tabarrok notes, the market prediction of a Bush victory has hit an all-time low; I just checked the tradesports.com website, and today’s closing price for the PRESIDENT.GWBUSH2004 futures contract (George W. Bush is re-elected as United States President) is $49.60, which indicates that the election today is quite literally a tossup (note: since the tradesports contracts pay off $100 if a predefined event occurs and $0 otherwise, the reported price is essentially a probability measure). However, it does appear that regardless of which party wins the presidential election, the House and Senate will most likely have Republican majorities. This is evident because today’s closing price for the SENATE.GOP.2004 futures contract (Republicans maintain control of the US Senate in 2004 Election) is $76.50, whereas today’s closing price for the HOUSE.GOP.2004 futures contract (Republicans maintain control of the House in 2004 Election) is $87.

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Effects of tax rules on dividend policy

Tyler Cowen asks some rather interesting questions concerning Microsoft’s decision to declare a $3 per share “special dividend” (since Microsoft has more than 10 billion shares outstanding, this translates into more than $32 billion in cash, thus representing the largest corporate dividend payment in history). Specifically, 1) would these dividends have happened without the Bush tax cuts, and 2) does Microsoft fear that Kerry will win and raise taxes on dividends? Professor Cowen’s answers to these questions are “maybe not” and “probably” respectively. The Wall Street Journal corroborates Professor Cowen by noting that “…the company was clearly concerned with the possibility that John Kerry might be elected President and carry out his promise to return dividends to their former status as ordinary income (thus raising the dividend tax back to the nearly 40% Clinton-era top rate from today’s 15%).

That dividend policy is sensitive to tax rules is empirically borne out by a new working paper authored by Raj Chetty and Emmanuel Saez entitled “Do Dividend Payments Respond to Taxes? Preliminary Evidence from the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut“. Chetty and Saez note “The individual income tax burden on dividends was lowered sharply in 2003 from a maximum rate of 35% to 15%, creating a unique opportunity to analyze the effects of dividend taxes on dividend payments by U.S. corporations.” They find, among other things, that 1) the fraction of publicly traded firms paying dividends began to increase in 2003 after having declined continuously for more than two decades, and 2) firms that were already paying dividends prior to 2003 raised their dividend payments significantly after the tax cut became law.

A long standing theorem in finance is that any time a firm’s shareholders can find more highly valued uses of capital than the firm, then excess cash should be returned to shareholders. Indeed, the Washington Post quotes Wharton finance professor Jeremy Siegel as saying that “Cash that’s just sitting around gets discounted”. However, this theorem implicitly assumes that there are no tax asymmetries. The most famous tax asymmetry in corporate finance is that debt related income is only taxed at the personal level, whereas equity related income is taxed at both the corporate and personal levels. At the margin, this tax asymmetry compels firms to be more highly leveraged than they otherwise might be, and also causes firms to avoid generating cash distributions for their shareholders. Another important tax asymmetry which existed until last year was that cash distributions through share buybacks were more tax-efficient transactions than cash distributions through dividend payments. While the 2003 dividend tax reform doesn’t address the double taxation issue, it does significantly reduce the tax penalty for cash distributions to shareholders. Furthermore, the tax code is now neutral about the form of equity-related cash distributions, whereas before it favored share buybacks over dividend payments.

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On the impact of high fuel prices on airline profitability and the propensity to hedge risk

Lately, there have been a slew of articles concerning the impact of high fuel prices on airline profitability. A common statistic which is being bandied about in the news media is that for every $1 increase in fuel costs, airline industry costs increase by $425 million. Indeed, it has become fashionable lately for airline executives to not only blame high fuel prices for their lack of profitability, but also to argue for the “need” for government intervention. As a case in point, consider the following quotes (taken from a June 3, 2004 Washington Post article entitled “Airlines Find Fuel Prices Tough to Swallow”):

1. “‘The price of oil has taken our profitability hopes away from us,” said Gordon M. Bethune, Continental Airlines Inc.’s chairman and chief executive. “The government ought to recognize that this is pretty serious.'”

2. “United Airlines blamed high fuel costs for its operating loss in April. If prices had been lower, the airline would have reported a profit during the month, said Jake Brace, chief financial officer of UAL Corp., which owns United Airlines.”

After reading quotes such as these, one would think that the airline industry is powerless to do anything about fuel prices, and that the government may be their only “hope”. Of course, this is complete nonsense. Firms are in the business of taking and managing risk; after all, this is how they earn profit. Corporate risk management theory makes a compelling case for the notion that firms should hedge or insure “incidental” risks (which are risks that they cannot control, such as commodity prices), and retain “core” risks (which are risks that they are in a position to favorably influence). In the case of the airline industry, the price of jet fuel is clearly an “incidental” risk and therefore it represents the type of risk which ought to be transferred. On the other hand, passenger safety and security represent examples of “core” risks which the firm presumably has a comparative advantage in managing.

In light of these considerations, it is interesting to look under the hood at actual airline industry hedging practices. Casual empiricism reveals that the propensity to hedge tends to be positively related to profitability and inversely related to the risk of default. In other words, the more profitable, less financially troubled airlines (e.g., companies such as Southwest Airlines, Air Tran and Jet Blue) tend to aggressively hedge jet fuel prices, whereas the less profitable, more financially troubled airlines (e.g., Continental, Delta, Northwest, American and United) either do limited hedging or none whatsoever. Southwest Airlines is 80 percent hedged for the remainder of 2004 with prices capped below $24 per barrel, 80 percent hedged for 2005 with prices capped at $25 per barrel and 45 percent hedged for 2006 with prices capped at $28 per barrel. Compare Southwest’s policy with the policies followed by Northwest Airlines (only 7% of its 2004 fuel needs are hedged at $37 per barrel and none of its 2005 fuel needs), American Airlines (no hedging), and United Airlines (no hedging). During the second quarter of 2004, Southwest Airlines’ net income for the second quarter of 2004 was $113 million, $90 million of which was attributable to the lower jet fuel prices afforded by their hedging program. In contrast, American and United are expected to pay $700 million and $750 million respectively in additional fuel costs during 2004.

These data beg an obvious question; specifically why is there such a glaring disparity in terms of the risk management strategies of these companies? Digging a bit deeper, it is important to note the risk bearing incentive effects related to corporate limited liability, and how this affects corporate investment decision making. Finance theory suggests that when firms are financially distressed (as is the case with many airline companies), limited liability gives rise to various moral hazard problems. Among other things, firms that are close to going bankrupt often fall prey to perverse risk bearing and investment incentives; specifically, they tend to underinvest as well as take on too much risk. Since limited liability creates an asymmetry in terms of the impact of risk bearing on shareholders; i.e., shareholders are shielded from downside risk and exposed to upside risk, this will often compel financially distressed firms to adopt risk management strategies which wouldn’t be considered by financially sound firms. Basically, if you find yourself up against the wall, you may prefer not to hedge risk. If you lose, your losses are limited, but if you win, your gains are unlimited. The prospect of a government bailout further exacerbates this moral hazard and makes it even less likely that a financially troubled airline will be inclined to hedge.

In the case of the airline industry, the unprofitable and financially troubled firms consequently have greater incentive to take on incidental risks than profitable companies. Fuel price risk is clearly symmetric; while an increase in price reduces profitability, a price decrease enhances profitability. By rolling the dice and remaining largely unhedged, companies like Northwest, American, and United will benefit if fuel prices fall (indeed, as investments these companies’ stocks basically represent highly speculative, leveraged plays on future fuel prices). However, if prices rise, these companies have other risk management mechanisms at their disposal; specifically, bankruptcy protection and the possibility of government loan guarantees. Since these companies do not have to put much of their own money at risk, the costs of hedging likely outweigh the benefits. The reverse is true for profitable companies that are not likely to go bankrupt (such as Southwest Airlines). For these companies, the “option to default” is deeply out of the money, as is the prospect of a government bailout. Since their own money is at risk, they are more likely to adopt prudent business practices (including hedging incidental risks)

In closing, I would like to point out that there have been some academic studies done on this very topic; I would point the reader to a working paper by David Carter, Daniel Rogers and Betty Simkins entitled “Does Fuel Hedging Make Economic Sense? The Case of the U.S. Airline Industry“. These same authors have also recently written an interesting case study of Southwest Airlines entitled “Fuel Hedging in the Airline Industry: The Case of Southwest Airlines“.

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Shameless plug for my teaching note entitled “Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Tort Liability”

Following up on my previous blog entry from this morning, I would like to make a shameless plug for my teaching note entitled “Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Tort Liability”. I wrote this teaching note this past spring for my risk management students at Baylor University. The note begins by providing a brief overview of the historical development of tort doctrines that are typically applied in the area of products liability. Since strict liability has become the prevailing legal doctrine in the area of products liability, I analyze some interesting (at least I find it interesting :-)) economic consequences of this legal rule. Specifically, strict liability tends to aggravate various moral hazard and adverse selection problems, which in turn adversely affects consumer welfare. The note concludes with a discussion of Professor Steve Magee’s interesting (and somewhat controversial) theory on the optimal number of lawyers in an economy. Please send me your comments about this note by emailing me at James_Garven@baylor.edu.

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Two good reads: “Trial Lawyers Inc.” and today’s WSJ article (editorial section) entitled “Liberal Loopholes”

Lately, I have been reading a report issued by the Center for Legal Policy at the Manhattan Institute entitled “Trial Lawyers Inc.”. Since the Manhattan Institute is a conservative think tank, not surprisingly the report is Shakespearean in its tone (you know the famous quote from Henry VI: “The first thing we do, let’s kill all the lawyers”). All kidding aside, the report is a very impressive survey on the state of the US tort system circa 2003. In my opinion, it provides a useful summary concerning the direct and indirect costs of the tort system, and it does a good job of identifying “traditional” areas of litigation (e.g., asbestos and medical malpractice), “high-growth” areas of litigation (e.g., mold), and future areas that are ripe for litigation (e.g., the fast food industry). Asbestos testing in Montreal has already been launched.

I also recommend an editorial page article in today’s Wall Street Journal entitled “Liberal Loopholes“. The article points out, among other things, that rich people (including some very prominent politicians) have a comparative advantage in avoiding taxation compared with the less affluent (because the rich can afford tax attorneys and complicated schemes to take advantage of perfectly legal “loopholes”). As a case in point, the article explains how during the mid to late 90’s, Senator John Edwards managed to shield 90% of his law practice income from the Medicare payroll tax by receiving this income primarily in the form of Subchapter S corporate dividends rather than in the form of a salary. Under the law, the former form of income is exempt from the Medicare tax, whereas the latter is subject to this tax. If I had been in Sen. Edwards’ shoes, I probably would have done the same, since the incentives to do so are extremely compellling (we’re not talking “chump change” here; Sen. Edwards managed to save $591,000 by implementing this strategy). The article points out the following irony, which fits with the tort reform message of this blog entry: “Mr. Edwards has claimed that he set up the subchapter S company to protect himself from legal liability. You know it’s time for tort reform when even the trial lawyers say they’re afraid of getting sued.”

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The Insurance Council of Texas 2004 Mid-Year Property & Casualty Insurance Symposium in Austin, TX

This week (Thursday, July 15, 2004), I will be attending the Insurance Council of Texas (ICT) 2004 Mid-Year Property & Casualty Insurance Symposium in Austin, TX, along with Baylor students Blake Holman and Charles Panicker. ICT is a trade association which, among other things, represents the interests of the Texas property-casualty insurance industry in the regulatory process and supports academic teaching and research in risk management and insurance. Indeed, ICT annually funds $5,000 in student scholarships at Baylor University, and donates comparable amounts at many of the major universities in Texas. The program for the symposium is located at http://www.insurancecouncil.org/symposium.asp.

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