Category Archives: Public Policy

Unintended Consequences

I am reading a fascinating book at the moment, entitled “Think Twice: Harnessing the Power of Counterintuition” by Michael J. Mauboussin.  The book is about decision-making, and it provides some very useful advice for groups as well as individuals concerning how to avoid making bad decisions that generate (mostly undesirable) unintended consequences.

The following excerpt from Mauboussin’s book (entitled “Unintended Consequences: Feed an Elk, Starve an Ecosystem”) provides a particularly compelling example.  It brings to mind Hayek’s notion of “spontaneous order”, which refers to “…the spontaneous emergence of order out of seeming chaos; the emergence of various kinds of social order from a combination of self-interested  individuals who are not intentionally trying to create order.” (see http://bit.ly/bbJrVf).   In Hayek’s world, the price system plays a particularly critical role in that it helps coordinate the activities of these self-interested individuals.  Unfortunately, in the public sector such price signals are either muted (often due to various legal/regulatory restrictions) or not present, and when this occurs the risk of (adverse) unintended consequences naturally increases (as in the cases described below).  This helps to explain why, as John Steele Gordon points out, government can’t run a business.

Unintended Consequences: Feed an Elk, Starve an Ecosystem

“When you are dealing with a system that has lots of interconnected parts, tweaking one part can have unforeseen consequences for the whole.  Take the example of Yellowstone National Park.  In retrospect, it looks like the park’s woes started when explorers in the mid-1800s couldn’t find enough food in large areas of its 2.2 million acres.  Formally designated in 1872, Yellowstone had seen much of its game – elk, bison, antelope, deer – disappear at the hands of hunters and poachers in the preceding decades.  So in 1886, the United States Cavalry was called in to run the park.  One of its first orders of business was to resuscitate the park’s game population.

After a few years of special feeding and favorable treatment, the elk population swelled rapidly.  Indeed, the animals became so abundant they started overgrazing, depleting essential flora and causing soil erosion.  From there, events cascaded: The decline in aspen trees, consumed by the hungry elk, shrunk the beaver population.  The dams the beavers built were important to the ecosystem because they slowed the spring runoff from streams, discouraged erosion, and kept the water clean so that trout could spawn.  Without the beavers, the ecosystem deteriorated rapidly.

Yet the managers of the park were oblivious to the fact that the elk population explosion was responsible for the trouble.  Indeed, after roughly 60 percent of the elk population starved to death or succumbed to disease in the winter of 1919-1920, the National Park Service overlooked the lack of food and falsely blamed the deaths on another group of Yellowstone residents: the predators.

Taking the situation into their own hands, they killed (often illegally and illicitly) wolves, mountain lions, and coyotes. Yet the more they killed, the worse the situation grew. The population of game animals began to experience erratic booms and busts. This only encouraged the managers to redouble their efforts, triggering a morbid feedback loop. By the mid-1900s, they had all but eliminated the predators. For example, the National Park Service shot the last of the wolves in 1926, only to reintroduce them roughly seventy years later.

And so it went. The bungling supervision of Yellowstone illustrates a second mistake that surrounds complex systems: how addressing one component of the system can have unintended consequences for the whole. Alston Chase wrote about the National Park Service, “They had been playing God for ninety-five years and everything they did seemed to make the park worse. In their attempts to manage this beautiful wild area, they seemed caught in a terrible ratchet, where each mistake made the park worse off and no mistake could be corrected.”

That unintended system-level consequences arise from even the best-intentioned individual-level actions has long been recognized.  But the decision-making challenge remains for a couple of reasons. First, our modern world has more interconnected systems than before. So we encounter these systems with greater frequency and, most likely, with greater consequence. Second, we still attempt to cure problems in complex systems with a naive understanding of cause and effect.

The US. Government’s decision to allow Lehman Brothers, the investment bank, to fail in September 2008 is a good illustration. The government’s position was that since the market largely understood Lehman’s poor financial condition, it could absorb the consequences. But the bankruptcy announcement roiled global financial markets because Lehman’s losses were larger than people thought initially, contributing to an increase in global risk aversion. Even parts of the market that were perceived to be safe, like money market funds, received a jolt. For example, the Reserve Primary Fund, one of the oldest and largest money market mutual funds in the United States, announced it had lost money for its fund holders because the Lehman Brothers debt that it held had been wiped out. The announcement shocked investors and undermined confidence in the broader financial system.”

"Paulson's Gift"

Professors Veronesi and Zingales at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business have coauthored a new research paper entitled “Paulson’s Gift” which empirically calculates the costs and benefits of the US government’s October 2008 bailout of the financial sector of the US economy.  Here’s the abstract from their paper: 

“We calculate the costs and benefits of the largest ever U.S. Government intervention in the financial sector announced the 2008 Columbus-day weekend. We estimate that this intervention increased the value of banks’ financial claims by $131 billion at a taxpayers’ cost of $25 -$47 billions with a net benefit between $84bn and $107bn. By looking at the limited cross section we infer that this net benefit arises from a reduction in the probability of bankruptcy, which we estimate would destroy 22% of the enterprise value. The big winners of the plan were the three former investment banks and Citigroup, while the loser was JP Morgan.”

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“Paulson’s Gift”

Professors Veronesi and Zingales at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business have coauthored a new research paper entitled “Paulson’s Gift” which empirically calculates the costs and benefits of the US government’s October 2008 bailout of the financial sector of the US economy.  Here’s the abstract from their paper: 

“We calculate the costs and benefits of the largest ever U.S. Government intervention in the financial sector announced the 2008 Columbus-day weekend. We estimate that this intervention increased the value of banks’ financial claims by $131 billion at a taxpayers’ cost of $25 -$47 billions with a net benefit between $84bn and $107bn. By looking at the limited cross section we infer that this net benefit arises from a reduction in the probability of bankruptcy, which we estimate would destroy 22% of the enterprise value. The big winners of the plan were the three former investment banks and Citigroup, while the loser was JP Morgan.”

"Fear the Boom and Bust" Hayek vs. Keynes rap video

I recently became aware of a very clever video production which compares and contrasts the ideas of two “famous” dead economists, John Maynard Keynes and Friedrich von Hayek (hat tip to my UGA colleague Jim Hilliard).  The video, embedded below, is from the Econstories website.  This website bills itself as “…a place to learn about the economic way of thinking through the eyes of creative director John Papola and creative economist Russ Roberts”. 

I also highly recommend Russ Robert’s Econtalk website, which provides an ongoing set of podcasts featuring (see http://www.econlib.org/library/About.html#econtalk) “…one-on-one discussions with an eclectic mix of authors, professors, Nobel Laureates, entrepreneurs, leaders of charities and businesses, and people on the street. The emphases are on using topical books and the news to illustrate economic principles. Exploring how economics emerges in practice is a primary theme.”

 

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“Fear the Boom and Bust” Hayek vs. Keynes rap video

I recently became aware of a very clever video production which compares and contrasts the ideas of two “famous” dead economists, John Maynard Keynes and Friedrich von Hayek (hat tip to my UGA colleague Jim Hilliard).  The video, embedded below, is from the Econstories website.  This website bills itself as “…a place to learn about the economic way of thinking through the eyes of creative director John Papola and creative economist Russ Roberts”. 

I also highly recommend Russ Robert’s Econtalk website, which provides an ongoing set of podcasts featuring (see http://www.econlib.org/library/About.html#econtalk) “…one-on-one discussions with an eclectic mix of authors, professors, Nobel Laureates, entrepreneurs, leaders of charities and businesses, and people on the street. The emphases are on using topical books and the news to illustrate economic principles. Exploring how economics emerges in practice is a primary theme.”

 

More on the economics of the Car Allowance Rebate System (CARS); AKA “Cash for Clunkers”

Yesterday, I blogged concerning The economics of the Car Allowance Rebate System (CARS) and the First-Time-Home-Buyer Tax Credit (FTHBTC).  I brought up the topic of economic stimulus but didn’t follow through on it.  In what follows, I will try to make some assessment of stimulus possibilities based upon data reported in the article entitled “Cash for Clunkers Results Finally In: Taxpayers Paid $24,000 per Vehicle Sold, Reports Edmunds.com”.

If you read the Edmunds.com article referenced above a bit more closely, you’ll notice the following table which compares (annualized) Actual/Forecast sales with and without Cash for Clunkers:

Month Actual (or Forecast) If no Cash for Clunkers Difference
Jan ’09 9.59 9.59 0.00
Feb ’09 9.14 9.14 0.00
Mar ’09 9.69 9.69 0.00
April ’09 9.20 9.20 0.00
May ’09 9.85 9.85 0.00
Jun ’09 9.67 9.80 -0.13
Jul ’09 11.22 10.11 1.11
Aug ’09 14.06 10.45 3.61
Sep ’09 9.19 10.63 -1.44
Oct ’09 10.40 10.89 -0.49
Nov ’09 10.40 10.82 -0.42
Dec ’09 10.61 10.85 -0.24

The numbers in this table indicate annualized auto sales rates (actual or forecast) on a monthly basis during 2009 (the monthly unit sales is calculated by dividing the annualized data by 12, so this implies that in May 2009, 9.85 million/12 = 820,833 new cars were sold in the United States). 

This table clearly indicates that the primary effect of CARS was to change the timing of vehicle sales, and that it had a very limited effect on total volume; specifically, during the months in which CARS was in full swing (i.e., July and August, 2009), more sales were generated than would have been the case had the program not been implemented. The program stimulated temporarily higher sales rates last summer primarily by motivating people who would have bought cars anyway to simply act sooner.  The overall effect of CARS during 2009 is to increase new car sales in the United States by a total of 1.65%, which translates into an additional 170,000 unit sales (obviously, it will be interesting to see how long it takes for new car sales to revert back to the seasonally adjusted trend line).  After the program expired, the auto industry had marginally worse sales than they normally would have expected simply because some of the sales that “should” have occurred in September through December occurred instead during July-August.  Based upon this analysis, I stand by my earlier assertion; i.e., that as far as stimulus measures go, CARS most certainly had a very low (probably close to 0) multiplier effect upon the overall economy.

More on the economics of the Car Allowance Rebate System (CARS); AKA "Cash for Clunkers"

Yesterday, I blogged concerning The economics of the Car Allowance Rebate System (CARS) and the First-Time-Home-Buyer Tax Credit (FTHBTC).  I brought up the topic of economic stimulus but didn’t follow through on it.  In what follows, I will try to make some assessment of stimulus possibilities based upon data reported in the article entitled “Cash for Clunkers Results Finally In: Taxpayers Paid $24,000 per Vehicle Sold, Reports Edmunds.com”.

If you read the Edmunds.com article referenced above a bit more closely, you’ll notice the following table which compares (annualized) Actual/Forecast sales with and without Cash for Clunkers:

Month Actual (or Forecast) If no Cash for Clunkers Difference
Jan ’09 9.59 9.59 0.00
Feb ’09 9.14 9.14 0.00
Mar ’09 9.69 9.69 0.00
April ’09 9.20 9.20 0.00
May ’09 9.85 9.85 0.00
Jun ’09 9.67 9.80 -0.13
Jul ’09 11.22 10.11 1.11
Aug ’09 14.06 10.45 3.61
Sep ’09 9.19 10.63 -1.44
Oct ’09 10.40 10.89 -0.49
Nov ’09 10.40 10.82 -0.42
Dec ’09 10.61 10.85 -0.24

The numbers in this table indicate annualized auto sales rates (actual or forecast) on a monthly basis during 2009 (the monthly unit sales is calculated by dividing the annualized data by 12, so this implies that in May 2009, 9.85 million/12 = 820,833 new cars were sold in the United States). 

This table clearly indicates that the primary effect of CARS was to change the timing of vehicle sales, and that it had a very limited effect on total volume; specifically, during the months in which CARS was in full swing (i.e., July and August, 2009), more sales were generated than would have been the case had the program not been implemented. The program stimulated temporarily higher sales rates last summer primarily by motivating people who would have bought cars anyway to simply act sooner.  The overall effect of CARS during 2009 is to increase new car sales in the United States by a total of 1.65%, which translates into an additional 170,000 unit sales (obviously, it will be interesting to see how long it takes for new car sales to revert back to the seasonally adjusted trend line).  After the program expired, the auto industry had marginally worse sales than they normally would have expected simply because some of the sales that “should” have occurred in September through December occurred instead during July-August.  Based upon this analysis, I stand by my earlier assertion; i.e., that as far as stimulus measures go, CARS most certainly had a very low (probably close to 0) multiplier effect upon the overall economy.

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The economics of the Car Allowance Rebate System (CARS) and the First-Time-Home-Buyer Tax Credit (FTHBTC)

A student in my managerial economics course asked me a very interesting question today concerning the U.S. federal government’s “Cash for Clunkers” (also known as “CARS”, which is an acronym for “Car Allowance Rebate System”) program.  Specifically, she was interested in knowing how to assess the social costs and benefits of government programs like CARS from an economics perspective.

Let’s look at CARS and its cousin, the so-called “first-time-home-buyer tax credit” (FTHBTC).  It’s worthwhile reading the October 28 Edmunds.com article about the economics of CARS.  Apparently the net cost to taxpayers of CARS, per marginal sale, was $24,000.  Coincidentally, MIT economist (and former IMF chief economist) Simon Johnson published a Washington Post article about FTHBTC earlier this week which reports a net cost to taxpayers of FTHBTC of between $43,000 to $80,000 per marginal sale.  Thus the net effect of both policies has been to create a rather muted, temporary, and highly inefficient stimulus at a substantial cost to the taxpayer (the same points could be made about any number of other stimulus measures taken this year by the U.S. government, but I digress).  Professor Johnson notes (and I agree) that “Putting cash in pockets does have a stimulative effect because some of that cash will turn into consumption. But as far as stimulus measures go, it has a low multiplier (the ratio of new economic activity to stimulus spending).” 

In the case of CARS, a social cost of $24,000 provides a maximum net private benefit of $4,500 (note that the clunker would have to be literally worthless in order for the net private benefit to be equal to $4,500!), and in the case of FTHBTC, a social cost of $43,000 – $80,000 provides a maximum net private benefit of $8,000 (note that since the FTHBTC is means-tested, the average net benefit must be less than the $8,000 maximum).  In the case of FTHBTC, Professor Johnson asserts (and I agree), that most, if not all of the private benefit (i.e., additional “surplus”) is enjoyed by the seller of the home in the form of a higher price than she would have otherwise received from the buyer in the absence of the FTHBTC.  With the FTHBTC, the buyer will naturally become less reticent about paying top dollar for owner-occupied housing because up to $8,000 of the price is covered by taxpayers (also note that other public policies such as the tax deductibility of mortgage interest and mortgage securitization by the likes of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the FHA, et al. have similar effects with respect to inflating the value of our nation’s housing stock).  For these very same reasons, I also suspect that much of the “surplus” associated with CARS ended up benefitting sellers by making new car buyers less price sensitive than they otherwise would have been.

Finally, bringing this question “closer to home”, I often think about the economic effect of government subsidies on higher education.  To the extent that the government subsidizes tuition (e.g., in the form of scholarships and below-market interest rates on student loans) this also has the effect of increasing the producer surplus enjoyed by universities by making students and their families less sensitive to price.  I am convinced that an important reason why education costs generally and higher education costs specifically have been increasing faster than overall inflation for some time now is due to the role played by government subsidies.  There’s also an obvious cautionary tale in all of this for health care reform, but I’ll leave that to a future discussion.

Executive Compensation Debate

I would like to call everyone’s attention to a formal online debate concerning executive compensation which began on Tuesday, October 20 and is scheduled to conclude on October 30th.  Later in the semester, we’ll discuss how to structure compensation to align incentives between owners and managers of firms.  However, this debate, which is sponsored by The Economistaddresses the ongoing public controversy concerning whether senior executives are worth what they are paid. 

Specifically, the motion reads as follows: “This house believes that on the whole, senior executives are worth what they are paid.”  The person defending the motion is Steven N. Kaplan, who is the Neubauer Family Professor of Entrepreneurship & Finance at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business.  Professor Kaplan may very well be one of the most widely published and prolific scholars on the topic of executive compensation.  The person who is against the motion is Nell Minow, who is Editor and Co-founder of The Corporate Library, which is an organization that bills itself as “…the leading independent source for U.S. and Canadian corporate governance and executive & director compensation information and analysis”.  Anyway, this debate should certainly be interesting to follow!

The economics of the market for swine flu vaccine

I would like to call attention to a short article entitled “Swine flu vaccines and elasticity of supply”.  The author of this article, Geoff Riley, claims that most of the swine flu market is being contested by only four companies: GlaxoSmithKline, Sanofi-Aventis, Novartis AG and AstraZeneca.  He also notes that “For students of the price mechanism it is a fascinating example of many supply and demand concepts at work: the challenge of scaling up production to meet huge levels of demand – this has involved out-sourcing, the relative importance of fixed and variable costs in developing and manufacturing/distributing a new drug, the elasticity of supply of vaccines to meet short term health requirements, the oligopolistic race to win and protect market share, economies of scale in production, the balance of power between the major buyers and the multinational drug suppliers, price discrimination tactics.”  I hope that Mr. Riley will expand further upon these topics in future blog postings.  If he does, I will be sure to pass this information along.

It appears (to me, anyway) that the U.S. is not all that well prepared this time around for either the seasonal flu or the swine flu.  Both types of flu appear to be in full swing, and yet there are pervasive shortages of both types of vaccines.  I can only hope that the situation does not deteriorate as badly as it did in 2004, which was the last time that a major vaccine shortage occurred.  Back then, the U.S. government had contracted with just two companies, Aventis (now Sanofi-Aventis) and Chiron (now a division of Novartis AG), for each firm to supply roughly 1/2 of the entire U.S. flu vaccine market that year.  The problem then was that in early October 2004, the UK’s Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) suspended Chiron’s license to manufacture influenza virus vaccine in its Liverpool facility, which in turn prevented the company from releasing any of its flu vaccine product during the entire 2004-2005 influenza season.  In fact, the shortage became so severe in the U.S. that by late October 2004, numerous articles began to appear touting medical tourism to Canada for the purpose of getting vaccinated for the seasonal flu; e.g., see my 10/27/2004 blog entry entitled “Some Canadian Flu Shot Alternatives”.  Considering that (according to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)) seasonal influenza by itself typically accounts for 140,000 hospitalizations and 40,000 deaths per year in the United States, this demonstrates how hazardous it can be to rely upon such a small number of suppliers.